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The United States Board of Tax, Appeals: Practice and Evidence. By
Charles D. Hamel. New York. Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1926. pp. lxxii, 222.
That the seven federal revenue acts since 1913 have been intricate to the
point of vexation is a commonplace. The implications of the statement,
however, are imperfectly understood. Back of it all, to an extent not
always realized, lies the phenomenal growth and expansion of the nation
since the Civil War. What was then a sparsely settled agricultural coun-
try, with tedious modes of transportation and comparatively little in the
way of commerce or manufacturing, has become a commonwealth of large
cities, highly developed areas of manufacture, large commercial and finan-
cial interests and tremendous aggregations of capital gainfully employed
in industrial enterprise. The greatly increased cost of government in re-
cent years necessitated larger revenues. Taxes on incomes and estates
seemed proper.
There were troublesome problems between the purpose and its execution.
Should the tax law be made simple and easy of application or should
equality and justice be paramount, even at the expense of a complex stat-
ute? That these were alternatives, both of which apparently could not
exist at the same time, seemed and still seems true. The low rates in the
earlier laws permitted something in the way of a compromise. The prob-
lem became acute with the hastily drawn Revenue Act of 1917. Experience
has shown that a simple tax law when applied to an extremely intricate,
highly specialized industrial society works injustice. A corollary justice
seems to be obtainable, under such circumstances, only at the expense of a
highly complicated law.
An important implication of the situation relates to the technique of
administration, the acid test of a tax statute. Since the Revenue Act of
1917, Congress seems to have preferred complexity in the law to simplicity
with injustice. How may such a law best be administered? Legal ques-
tions without number arise. In each case it is necessary to determine the
facts upon which tax liability rests. Who shall resolve these questions?
To what extent shall the government force the taxpayer to prove that he
is not subject to tax? Should the tax laws be applied by the same general
procedure as the Sherman Anti-Trust Law, the Clayton Law and other
like statutes relating to business, or should the tax laws be handled by
some sort of an administrative machine, the favorite device of government
in recent decades, when laws broadly applicable to many classes of a com-
plex society must be put into effect? To what extent and at what stage of
dispute should tax controversies be turned into the federal courts? These
and other serious problems were presented.
It may be said that between 1913 and 1924, from an administrative
standpoint, the government was constantly engaged in the solution of these
problems. The organization of the Bureau of Internal Revenue was subjected
to fundamental changes time and time again by way of experiment. Even
Congress took a hand. At one time or another there were various com-
mittees and boards within the Department, various modes of procedure,
different distributions of authority as between Washington and the field,
and many other changes. Procedure was in a state of constant flux and
experimentation. Many of the expedients have utterly failed. None has
been wholly successful.
In 1924, Congress made a radical change. It turned to the idea of a tax
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court. The United States Board of Tax Appeals was created. At first
it was proposed that the Board be part of the Treasury Department. This
was abandoned. Anomalously enough, when the act was passed, the Board
appeared as an independent agency in the executive branch of the govern-
ment. The establishment of its character as a court during 1924 and 1925
would furnish the subject for a fascinating study which might prove of
considerable significance in regard to certain conceptions and theories of
administrative law. The congressional approval in the Revenue Act of
1926 of the judicial character of the Board has now definitely stamped it
as a court. The latest experiment in the administration of the federal
tax laws seems to have received to date more approval than disapproval
and signs are not wanting that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
and the public find the Board of assistance in the solution of theze prob-
lems.
The Board has been in existence about two and one-half years. Its
work is largely in the future. From its limited experience, however, cer-
tain deductions may be made and certain paths for its growth may tenta-
tively be charted. Mr. Hamel in writing his book has drawn from an
exceptionally broad experience, first within the Bureau, later as first
chairman of the Board and more recently as tax advocate both before
the Bureau and the Board. If in this volume he has limited rather strictly
his predictions for the future, the answer may be that in such a compli-
cated field, the future is anyone's guess. It may be that in accurately
recording the judicial experience of the Board the largest measure of
service is conferred. This Mr. Hamel has done.
The first chapter in the book gives a short statement of the events which
preceded the creation of the Board. The second chapter is devoted to the
procedure within the Bureau which precedes an appeal to the Board.
This procedure, at the present time, is not as difficult as the beginner may
think The usefulness of chapter two, of course, depends on the extent to
which the Bureau procedure may be changed while the book remains cur-
rent. At the present time it is a useful and necessary part of the volume.
The third chapter deals with the jurisdiction of the Board. It appears to
have been written from a practical standpoint, and in a practical view
the discussion is adequate. From the standpoint of theory, it may be
doubted perhaps that some of the sections in this chapter really concern
jurisdiction. For instance, section 43, "Invalid regulations may be disre-
garded by the Board," while true, may not be a jurisdictional matter. The
same may be said with respect to section 43, "No jurisdiction to decide
moot questions," which, after all, is merely the statement of an inherent
judicial attribute, and section 50, "Frivolous appeals-jurisdiction to award
damages to the Government," which, if a matter of jurisdiction at all,
comes only with a very broad meaning of the term. The last observation
is applicable to two or three other sections in the chapter.
The Revenue Act of 1924, -which created the Board, provided no par-
ticular standard for the admissibility of evidence. The 1920 Act requires
the Board to apply the rules of evidence which obtain in the equity courts
of the District of Columbia. Chapters six and seven deal with evidence.
The author has set forth the rules now applicable in simple language,
with many footnotes. In no other volume, within the knowledge of the
reviewer, are these cases and authorities collected. This service alone
makes Mr. Hamel's book of value to practitioners before the Board. There
is one fundamental difference between the situation in Board cases and
that in an equity suit, which, not infrequently, may affect rules of evi-
dence. In the latter, the contest is generally between the original parties
to the transaction in question. In the former, to the contrary, the govern-
ment steps in as a third party to impose a tax ordinarily based on a
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transaction of the taxpayer with some other individual or business or-
ganization. It is conceivable that instances will occur where the rules of
evidence would be different in the two contests though each centers around
the same transaction. Mr. Hamel has not attempted to point out cases
where such a difference might appear. Perhaps it was felt that the
task of compressing the law of evidence into two chapters was in itself
sufficiently burdensome. That task has been well done. The remaining
chapters deal lucidly with procedure after the hearing, including appeals
to federal appellate courts. The appendices contain useful matter. By
reference to the appendix the reader may have constantly before him all
of the provisions of the Revenue Act of 1926, which should add to the
serviceability of the book.
The chief contribution of the author, perhaps, has been to state in an
understandable way the authorities thus far developed. Possibly in sub-
sequent editions he may state at greater length his views on some of the
many matters yet undecided by the Board.
J. GILIER IORNER, JR.
Cases and Authorities on Public Utilities. By G. H. Robinson. Chicago,
Callaghan & Co., 1926. pp. xxiv, 976.
Cases on the Law of Public Utilities. By Young B. Smith and Noel T.
Dowling. Including Cases and Readings on Rates, by Robert L. Hale.
St. Paul, West Publishing Co., 1926. pp. xxvii, 1258.
The editors of both of these case books on Public Service Law refer by
way of justification to the rapid growth of the subject in recent years.
No apology, however, is needed for either book. Both are comprehensive
and intelligent; both are made up, especially Mr. Robinson's book, in
great part of the very late decisions in the field; both present the material
in attractive and interesting style. Every teacher will wish to own both
of them, and will wish to use one of them in the class-room.
Which one he will prefer for this purpose will largely depend on which
phases of the subject he regards as most important. If he feels, as does
the reviewer, the need of taking his students through the labyrinth of
rate-making in the hope that the next generation may cope with the prob-
lem more adequately than its predecessors, he will not let them escape
exposure to Mr. Hale's admirable presentation of the topic. If he thinks
with other teachers that rates are after all a political question, discussion
of which can lead nowhere; or if he believes, as many must who have
gone through the countless pages of law review discussion, that rates are
over-emphasized in current legal writing, he will agree with Mr. Robinson,
who says of the rate base (p. 348): "The attempt to present the prob-
lems of this section through the accepted pedagogical method of a series
of illustrative cases seems impossible for reason of the complexity of and
confusion in the cases on the one hand and the inability to find short
cases, on the other." With this Mr. Hale concurs in part, for he says in
his preface, "The law concerning rates is so confused as to present many
difficulties in the arrangement of cases." Nevertheless he has brilliantly
surmounted the obstacles which loomed so large to Mr. Robinson. A simi-
lar divergence appears as to the liability of the public servant. Smith
and Dowling devote 348 pages to the matter, 105 of them to limitation
of liability. Robinson, for the somewhat doubtful reason that texts cover
the subject fully, gives liability but 178 pages, and does not segregate
the topic of limitation at all. Smith and Dowling have also conferred a
favor on the hard pressed student by printing the Interstate Commerce
Act and the Elkins Act in full.
On the other hand, Mr. Robinson has collected much important material
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either absent from or incidentally treated in the other volume. He pre-
sents some 200 pages of cases on methods of enforcing the duties of pub-
lic utilities, on problems arising out of the commission form of govern-
ment now imposed on thesd companies, and on what he calls "interacting
areas of authority." The difficulties raised by these questions amply justify
the dedication of so much space to them; the editor has seen to it that
the space is well filled. He too has made his bow to the hard pressed stu-
dent by printing an extensive list of treatises and reviews thereof, and
an even more extensive table of periodical literature covering the subject-
matter of each of his chapters.
In their general approach to the cases the editors differ widely, and
in their treatment of them as well. Mr. Robinson has made a fresh start.
He sees the public utility concept and obligations resulting from it. There
are the obligation to serve "all," the obligation to serve without discrimi-
nation, the obligation to serve at reasonable rates, the obligation to serve
with adequate facilities, the obligation to continue service and the obli-
gations to persons for whom the service is undertaken. Numerous sub-
heads split the cases up conveniently. The decisions printed are not too
many nor too long. Where desirable, lengthy notes are appended including,
sometimes, opinions set out in full. Although the book may be for refer-
ence purposes somewhat confusing to the teacher brought up on the tradi-
tional alignment, it cannot fail to stimulate him and the members of his
classes. It is a well integrated piece of work.
The other book is more classical in outline. After 178 pages on the
regulation and control of business at common law and under statutes,
we come to the standard divisions: management, service, liability and rates.
Each subject is covered with care and skill. For the most part the cases
are numerous and extensive, to the reviewer too numerous and too exten-
sive. But no student could give the book more than passing attention
without having at the end a pretty complete picture of the public utility
in its relation to the courts. Each subject is prefaced usually by a few
historical eases, a device Mr. Robinson has not found it necessary to em-
ploy.
One general remark about both books may be added. Mr. Justice Bran-
deis showed in the Southwestern Bell Telcphone case, how much of the
law of public service is being made by the commissions, and how far they
may deviate in practice from the perhaps intentionally vague require-
ments laid down by the courts. Only Mr. Hale deals sufficiently with
the decisions of these boards to indicate to the student the part they are
playing in developing the subject. Aside from his chapter, the reader
might be left with the notion that the commissions are routine organiza-
tions, somehow inferior to the majesty of the judiciary and consequently
beneath the consideration of the future lawyer. A case book which does
not print a fair share of commission opinions is likely to give the average
man such an impression of their importance that the first case he meets
in practice will come as a rude awakening.
ROBERT LT. HUTCHINS
The Period of Baronial Reform and Rebellion 125S-1267. By E. F. Jacob.
0xford Studies in Social and Legal History, edited by Sir Paul Vino-
gradoff. New York, O.xford University Press, American Branch, 1925.
pp. xiv, 443.
As the author remarks, "at the root of much of the political unrest of
the years 1258-1267 lay the problems of local administration and of the
LSouthwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commission, 262 U. S.
276, 43 Sup. Ct. 544 (1923).
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land law." 1 His study therefore has a double aspect, constitutional and
legal, and it is the latter which will especially interest readers of this
Journal. The book is best regarded as a commentary upon the Statute of
Marlborough 2 in the light of contemporary social and political conditions.
These are described with much learning and skill by Dr. Jacob from ma-
terials consisting for the most part of legal and administrative records.
Unfortunately he does not carry the story down to the Statute with as
much fullness as we could wish. We should particularly like to hav6 his
opinion upon the suggestion we once ventured to make,3 namely, that the
idea of seisin and the related framework of possessory actions instituted
by Henry II had broken down under the stress of the Barons' Wars, and
that the Statute of Marlborough was an attempt to reconstruct the law
of real property by strictly limiting the operation of seisin as a root
of title. Much of the new evidence presented by Dr. Jacob is in accord
with this theory, and a direct treatment of the subject would be welcome,
for this very period is that during which Bracton and his numerous but
anonymous redactors were showing their great and intelligent interest
in restating the principles of the common law.
Reform was to be based on the work of that very modern device, the
judicial inquiry. The opposition, once in power, sent Hugh le Bigod on
eyre as Justiciar, and from his rolls Dr. Jacob draws conclusions of far-
reaching importance. Some contemporary critics accused the Justiciar of
irregularities, and Dr. Jacob has an interesting theory on the subject.4
Many of these proceedings, he believes, were not initiated by original writ,
but only by petition or by plaint. This touches the great problems of
the bill in eyre, the plaint in local courts and the bill in chancery, while
as the author points out, there are examples of plaints being heard in the
King's Court in Bracton's Note Book.5 The point which has given us the
greatest trouble is Dr. Jacob's argument that if an enrollment begins in
the form of A queritur de B quod . . . that therefore the proceedings
were without writ. This does not seem to us altogether proved. The
only peculiarity of this formula is the failure to mention summons or
attachment; apart from this it is substantially the same as the entry of
an action of trespass which begins B summonitus (or attachiatus) fuit
ad respondendum A quare . . . undo A queitur quod . . . etc. In
fact the peculiarity is not the complaint (which might well be alleged in
enrolling an action of trespass begun by original writ) but it is in the
absence of summons or attachment, and this is not in itself evidence of
the absence of an original writ. There is some reason to believe that
original writs were obtainable locally during an eyrec but as the time
of the judges was limited, it was manifestly impossible to allow all the
delays which were possible in ordinary proceedings. That they were
abridged is beyond doubt: Fitz Thedmar, in a valuable passage cited by
Dr. Jacob,7 asserts that the Justiciar finished off some cases "with no
reasonable summons made or essoin granted." But we are not so sure
as Dr. Jacob that this means that there was no writ at all, but only
a complaint; nor that it implies that there was no summons. On the
Ip. xii.
2 52 Henry III (1267).; 1 Statutes of the Realm, 19-25.
3 PLUCKNETT, STATUTES AND THEIR INTERPRETATION (1922) 100.
4 pp. 56ff., 65ff.
5 Procedure by bill persisted occasionally in the superior courts; we have
seen several on the plea rolls of the Court of Common Pleas during the
reign of Richard II. Procedure by bill was also possible in the King's
Bench, where one particular example became famous as the Bill of Mid-
dlesex.
6 BOLLAND, THE GENERAL EYRE (1922) 9.
7 pp. 56, 57.
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contrary, defendants were undoubtedly summoned by the sheriff. The
point that Fitz Thedmar is making seems to us not that there was no
summons, but that there was no reasonable summons (that is, as lengthy
delay as was possible under ordinary procedure). One thing is certain,
and that is the existence of a vague complaint-action which is strongly
reminiscent of the quare action described by Professor Woodbine at the
beginning of the centurys and one is tempted to suggest that these two
may be closely connected in the same line of development. Dr. Jacob
is certainly right in urging the need for "studies in the changes of proce-
dure and the forms of action which are taking place during this critical
time." 9 Whether the cases here described belong to the history of tres-
pass, or whether they are, as the late Sir Paul Vinogradoff suggests in
his introduction to this volume, "the first systematic use of the equity
procedure illustrated later on by the so-called bills in eyre" is a matter
for further inquiry by legal historians.
Of the numerous other questions on which a wealth of new light is cast,
there is no space to speak. Professor Willard has already mentioned many
of them.' o Ample appendices give original documents which assist the
reader materially in following the argument of the book. Dr. Jacob.has
handled a large mass of material with great skill and has given us a
thorough and learned study, which is of considerable interest from several
different points of view.
THEODoRE F. T. PLUCKhxuTT
A Treatise on the Law of Wills. By John R. Rood. Second Edition.
Chicago, Callaghan & Co., 1926. pp. ix, 1111.
The first edition of this work appeared in 1904. In the recent edition
chapters on Election, Acceptance and Renunciation, and on Powers have
been added. The footnotes have been improved by the citation of new
cases, and more recent compilations of the state statutes. The author is
entitled to high praise for having included in the footnotes references to
much material in the law reviews and in the annotated-case series. This
practice, which appears to be a growing one, ought to be of particular
benefit to practitioners, who are not likely to have the periodical indexes
at hand. The author has made a careful examination of the exceedingly
numerous and diverse statutory provisions concerning his subject-matter,
and has given abundant references thereto. It seems, however, that the
references are not always to the latest available revisions of the statutes;
nor is there entire consistency in the manner of their citation.
In its general scope the work is somewhat more than a treatise upon
Wills in the narrow sense. There are also chapters upon Descent and
Distribution, Jurisdiction of Court and Administration. As the title page
indicates, these chapters are designed as a summary of the law upon their
respective topics. While they are brief, they contain a reasonably complete
outline of the points commonly met with. Their inclusion in a text upon
Wills seems appropriate and expedient, particularly from the point of view
of a law-school student.
In his general style of statement, the author is forceful and convincing;
his English is clear and intelligible. In places it would appear that a
striving for short and effective statements has lead to over-generalization.
Thus, on page 87 one finds these sentences: "Forgetting a child, for exam-
ple, does not avoid the will. The child takes as if there were no will."
8 Woodbine, The Origins of the Action of Trespass (1925) 34 YAMu LAW
JOURNAL, 343, 354.
9 p. ii.
1L0 Reviewing this work in (1926) 40 HARV. L. REV. 146.
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If this is the usual consequence of omission of a child, it is because of
some statute, the terms of which must be carefully studied to make
certain of the result. Other instances of over-generalization will be
pointed out hereafter. The author uses the pronoun "I" with great fre-
quency. While this practice is unusual, it seems to add force and direct-
ness to the discussion, and imparts that element of human personality
which' is so often lacking in legal writing. The particular criticism which
may be offered upon the style of the discussion is-with respect to the Coke-
upon-Littleton method followed in many parts of the work-the method of
commenting upon the particular terms of a general statement, the particular
terms constituting sub-titles. This method appears objectionable to the re-
viewer because of its tendency toward deduction rather than induction. Gen-
eralizations are certainly an indispensable part of our machinery for dealing
with the materials of the law, but when we construct a legal treatise in this
manner, we are apt to forget that these generalizations are only shorthand
ways of stating the results of the cases, and not major premises by means
of which we can classify the cases as "right" and "wrong." While it is
not apparent that the writer himself has been misled by this form, it is
higlly probable that the reader may be. Perhaps the best illustration of
the dangers of this method is found in chapter four, entitled Definition,
Nature and Kinds of Wills. Here is everything to be found i" the book
upon the subject of contracts to make wills, discussed under the sub-title
Voluntary, suggested by that word as used in the author's preliminary
definition of a will. The artificial arrangement results in concealing this
topic, and in minimizing its importance. In chapter ten, upon Revocation,
one finds a second illustration of the same method; the discussion is based
on sub-titles consisting of words and phrases taken from the provisions
of the English Statute of Frauds concerning revocation of wills. It is
true that this statute is as nearly typical of our American statutes as any
that could be selected, but it is doubtful if it is expedient to give so much
emphasis to a particular form of phraseology.
What should be included in a text-book upon any subject is a matter
of convenience and of taste. There would be a certain advantage in
having all the law in one book. The line must be drawn somewhat arbi-
trarily. It is the feeling of the reviewer that Mr. Rood has included
matters that can be dealt with more profitably elsewhere. The chief
instances of such inclusion are found in chapter eight, in the treatment
of gifts in trust failing for want of definite cestui or a charitable
purpose, and other gifts failing because of the incapacity of a corporate
donee to take; in chapters fourteen, fifteen and sixteen, discussing ascertain-
ment -of beneficiaries, of subject-matter, and the quantum and duration
of estates; in chapter seventeen, dealing with expectant estates; in chapter
'eighteen, on the vesting and divesting of future estates; in chapter nine-
teen, treating of estates on condition; and in chapter twenty-three, upon
powers. In treating of topics of this sort in a treatise upon Wills, Mr,
Rood has followed the example of such eminent English writers as Jarman
and Theobald. But the matters touched upon in these chapters cannot be
adequately treated within a limited space, and it is questionable whether
more should be done than to mention the problems involved and refer
the reader to other places for further enlightenment. Proof of the difficulty
of the task attempted is found in the treatment of the construction of the
word "issue." On page 389 there is a discussion in connection with the
problem of ascertaining the beneficiary; on page 550 there is a further
discussion with respect to the quantum of the estate created when "issue"
is used. It is impossible for the casual reader to get any view of the
problem in its entirety. Nowhere does it clearly appear that "issue" in
a will was formerly regarded as prima facie a word of limitation, and
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that words of distribution were the important element in rebutting that
presumption. Nor is there indication of the recent tendency to construe
the word as one of purchase whenever possible.
Certain portions of the work do not seem adequate in their treatment
of important and difficult topics. The first noticeable lack is in the dis-
cussion of the historical development of the law of Wills. While there are
references to the Mosaic Law and to the Twelve Tables of Rome, there are
none to the early English law. Citation should at least be made of the books
where material on this point may be found. The chapter upon Error,
Fraud and Undue Influence impresses the reviewer as one of the least
satisfactory. No particular emphasis is placed upon the distinction betveen
the cases where the testator has read the will and those where he has not.
On page 117 the statement is made that "errors as to the identity or con-
tents of the instrument are fatal, because the writing never was the
testator's will." Yet on page 122 we read that omissions do not invali-
date the will, though they have "changed the whole scope and tenor of the
will." If the testator has executed a will in the belief that it contained
a gift which it did not contain, he has certainly been mistaken as to the
"contents" in the ordinary acceptation of that word. One also finds in
this chapter an example of reliance on verbal formulae which have been
handed down from generation to generation of legal writers. It is said
that equity will not reform a will, and one reason assigned is that "equity
will not interpose to perfect any imperfect voluntary transfer." If this
statement means that equity never creates rights not recognized in the
courts of law unless the one in whose favor they are created has paid a
consideration, it is obviously not true; witness the case of the declaration
of trust of personalty without consideration, which is everywhere en-
forced. Other cases might be mentioned in which equity has extended its
aid to "volunteers." The treatment of undue influence consists in large
part of quotations from judicial opinions. Elsewhere the work is singularly
free from this practice, and it does not appear that there has been any
gain by resort to it in this instance. A careful analysis of the various
types of cases in which the courts have declared "undue influence" to
exist would be more helpful.
In dealing with the subject of revocation, the author has treated lightly
the problems of the effect of divorce upon a will previously executed in
favor of the divorced spouse, and the effect of the revocation of a will upon
the validity of a codicil thereto. On the latter point there are no American
authorities cited. The doctrine of dependent relative revocation is treated
in two distinct places, once under the head of revocation by writing, and
again under the head of revocation by act of destruction. One notes with
surprise that the title "dependent relative revocation" does not appear in
the text or the index; it is found in a footnote on page 290. The discussion
of the topic is for the most part in terms of "condition," although the
word "mistake' appears in section headings. In a footnote on page 299
the author expresses his disagreement with Professor Joseph Warren, who,
explains most of the cases on the ground of revocation induced by mistake,
which the court disregards in order to rectify the error. Mr. Rood declares
that this would involve an exercise of "equity" power which courts of
probate in most states do not have. The question is how best to describe!
what the courts have actually done in these cases. Where the testator
destroys a first will under the mistaken impression that he has made a
valid second will, he has done the act of revocation which the statute re-
quires, and he has intended to take away all legal effect from the
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earlier instrument. There is nothing of "condition" in his mind;
he does not contemplate the possibility of invalidity of the second
will. If the court holds the first will unrevoked, it seems accurate to de-
scribe its action by saying that the revocation is disregarded in order to
correct the testator's mistake. This view of the matter is likely to lead
to a desirable result in a majority of the cases, because the court can
consider whether the testator's desires will be more nearly approximated
by thus setting aside the revocation, or by permitting it to stand, with a
consequential intestacy. It may be that courts of probate have assumed
"equity" powers not expressly given them by statute; if they are exer-
cising such powers, then they "have" them.
In the chapter upon Jurisdiction of Court, little is said concerning the
question of collateral attack upon a decree of a probate court. The whole
matter is dealt with in three brief paragraphs, on pages 811, 817 and 825.
In the chapter upon Administration of Estates, the whole matter of the
survival under modern statutes of tort actions in favor of a personal
representative has been put into a footnote on page 861, without any sug-
gestion in the text as to an underlying principle. While this chapter does
not pretend to be more than a summary, it is submitted that some general
statement could have been made.
Among the unusual features of the work are the advice and suggestions
offered from time to time. On page 226 there is a model attestation clause.
Beginning on page 256 are five pages of suggestions as to the drafting of
wills. This is a new feature in the second edition, and is to be commended.
The suggestions are clearly stated and are illustrated.
In its general make-up the work is good. There is a full and complete
index, and a table of cases. The latter is placed at the end, preceding the
index. This seems to the reviewer the appropriate place for it. So far
as the printing is concerned, there seems to be rather more than the per-
missible number of errors. The most glaring of these is the printing
of page 409 on the reverse side of 405, and 406 where 409 ought to be.
Apparently the publishers are correcting this error by supplying new pages
at these points.
MERRILL I. SCHNEBLY.
The Foreign Consul. His Juridical Status in the United States. By Julius
I. Puente. Chicago, Burdette J. Smith & Co., 1926. pp. xv, 157.
Mr. Puente modestly states that he "has attempted in this unassuming
volume a compendious presentation of the basic principles fixing the juri-
dical status of the foreign consul in the United States," observing at the
same time that "the Foreign Consular Service in the United States has,
beyond cavil, been much neglected by writers on jurisprudence."
There are upward of 1300 foreign consular officers in the United States
commissioned by fifty-five foreign governments, who are concerned with
the rights of the 13,712,754 aliens in this country accounted for by the
1920 census. The various problems which must undoubtedly arise from
the presence among us of these numerous foreign officials would appear
to merit greater attention on the part of legal writers. Not only does
there not exist any study covering this field, but there is not extant any
work in the English language dealing exclusively and comprehensively with
the question of consuls, their rights, powers and immunities. Professor
Stowell's Consular Cases and Opinions (1909) and Ernest Ludwig's Con-
sular Treaty Rights and Comments on the 'Most Favored Nation' Clause
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(1913)-with all the limitations which their titles imply-appear to be
the only works in the English language in this specialized field. Neither,
by the way, is mentioned by Mr. Puente.
Mr. Puente's book covers more ground than would seem to be implied by
its title: the author discusses generally the status of consular officers. It
is only when he reaches the question of the right of consuls to administer
the estates of their deceased nationals that he restricts himself to the
problem as it affects foreign consuls in this country.
The author in his preface states that he has had recourse to "the estab-
lished maxins of International Law, as recorded in the works of jurists and
commentators on the subject; the laws and judicial decisions, state and
federal, supplemented by English cases; and the official opinions of the
Attorney General of the United States and the Secretary of State." It
-would seem, however, that recourse should first be had to the treaties and
conventions in force between the United States and foreign powers, con-
taining provisions affecting consuls. In this relation attention may be
drawn to the excellent analysis of American treaty provisions relating to
consular privileges and immunities by Irwin Stewart in the January, 192G,
issue of the AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. Mr. Stewart
has classified treaty provisions relating to consular officers under such
headings as "Archives," "Taxation," "Exemption from Arrest" et cetera.
Such an arrangement will enable a consular officer not only to ascertain
at a glance what treaty provisions exist between his country and the
United States with regard to the particular subject in which he may at
the time be interested, but also to determine what treaty provisions he may
invoke under the "most favored nation" clause. Such a compendium of
treaty provisions with appropriate references to decisions of the courts
and of the executive branch of the government interpreting them is
believed to be of the greatest possible practical use to consular officers
desirous of ascertaining the privileges and immunities attaching to their
office.
It is to be regretted that MIr. Puente was unable to consider the Treaty
of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights between the United States
and Germany of December 8, 1923, which came into force upon the exchange
of ratifications on October 14, 1925. In many respects this treaty, which
has already served as a model for the drafting of similar treaties with
other countries, differs in the content of its provisions as well as
in their phraseology from previous conventions. It contains twelve
articles relating to consular officers which cannot fail to be of great
interest to all foreign consular officers in the United States as establish-
ing the latest point of view of this government with respect to the
rights and immunities of consular officers. As an indication of some
of the extensive rights accorded under this treaty to consuls, reference
may be made to Article XXVII thereof which permits a consular officer
to import free of duty personal property not only at a time of his entry
into the United States but at any time subsequent thereto, and to Article
XXV which provides in effect that a consular officer of either High Con-
tracting Party may, in behalf of his non-resident countrymen, receipt for
their distributive shares derived from estates in process of probate or
accruing under the provisions of the so-called workmen's compensation
laws.
Mr. Puente has been careful to support his statements by references to
the authorities, but in some instances it is at least doubtful whether 
he
reflects the views taken on a particular subject by the authorities in this
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country at the present day, with whose views, from a practical standpoint,
he is of course, primarily concerned. On page 24 he states that it "must not
be supposed that the grant of the exequatur places the consul under the
special protection of the law of nations"--reference being made to an
opinion of Attorney General Butler rendered in 1835. The Attorney General
appears to have had particularly in mind the fact that consuls are subject
to the civil and criminal laws of the country in which they exercise their
functions. On the next page Mr. Puente refers in a note to section 72
of the Consular Regulations of the United States (1896) in which the
following statement appears:
"They (i.e. consuls) are under the special protection of international
law and are regarded as the officials both of the state which appoints them
and the state which receives them."
On page 37 the author remarks that:
"He (i.e. the consul) is, however, under general public law, admittedly
entitled to, and accorded greater privileges and protection than uncom-
missioned foreigners
Referring to the privileges and immunities of a consular officer, the
author observes (page 35) that:
"Inferior consular officers, such as the vice-consul and the consular
agent, . . . are not, as a rule, accorded the advantage of these pre-
rogatives (i.e. those of principal consular officers). . .
On this point it may be observed that the provisions in consular con-
ventions between the United-States and foreign powers, defining the privi-
leges and immunities of consular officers usually include vice-consuls and
consular agents.
With regard to the statement on page 54 that "If there is a legation
representing the foreign government at the place where the consulate is
situated, the consul then has no right to display the national flag," it may
be noted that in Article XX of the treaty with Germany referred to above
it is provided that consular officers may hoist the flag of their country on
their offices, including those situated in the capitals of the two countries.
Mr. Puente discusses at some length the much debated question of the
"most favored nation" clause and reaches the conclusion that "as in com-
mercial treaties, so in consular conventions, considerations of equality of
international treatment, lend weight to the view that advantages under
the most-favored-nation pledge should not accrue to a foreign consul
except it be in exchange for valuable consideration from the country claim-
ing thereunder" (page 95). This conclusion is believed to be sound and
to be in accordance with the policy heretofore adhered to by the United
States. (See in this relation the circular instruction of the Department
of State of September 12, 1911, to diplomatic officers, relative to the im-
portation by foreign consular officers into the United States free of duty
of baggage and effects, to which reference is made on page 806 of Volume
I of Hyde's International Law.)
Mr. Puente would be the first to disclaim the intention of having en-
deavored to write a comprehensive treatise in the English language on
consuls-something which is still a conspicuous lacuna in the literature
of this branch of international jurisprudence. Indeed he tells us in his
preface that "it is confidently expected that a more capable pen will, in
time, bring out a text featuring a riper judgment, a more mature scholar-
